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SEAWORTHINESS AND SEAMEN
TERENCE

H. BEWBow*

Practically all modern cases involving seamen's injuries cite the term
"seaworthy." Decisions are made on the basis of whether or not, in the
case at hand, "seaworthy" or "unseaworthy" is the proper label to attribute
to the vessel.
Mr. Justice Brown's pronouncement of the four propositions of The
Osceola1 is the most famous statement in the admiralty law of the United
States involving seamen's rights in relation to personal injuries, The
Supreme Court refused a negligence recovery saying that a seaman could
only collect indemnity for an injury suffered in the service of his vessel
2
when the injury was due to the "unseaworthiness" of the vessel.
But is was for the modern day Supreme Court to be the first to sustain
a decision based on the doctrine that the shipowner's obligation to furnish
a seaworthy vessel to the "seamen" is absolute, i.e., not satisfied by the
exercise of reasonable care. Such a decision of the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals 3 was upheld in 1946 by a divided Supreme Court in Seas
Shipping Co. v.Sieracki.4 Sieracki was not a seaman, but a longshoreman
who was injured on the S.S. Robin Sherwood when a shackle supporting
a cargo boom failed.5 The district court assumed in passing that the shipowner's duty of seaworthiness was absolute as to a seaman. 6 But the court
found for the shipowner on its holding that Sieracki was not a "seaman."
The chief issue therefore in the circuit court was the longshoreman's claim
that he was a "seaman." In the light of then recent Supreme Court
dictum, 8 the shipowner probably found it preferable to admit that seamen
*B.A. University of Michigan, Instructor in Economics, Quhmipiac College, 11amden, Connecticut.
I. 189 U.S. 158 (1903). The Osceola involved an injury to a seaman caused
through the negligent order of the master.
2. Although the seaworthiness of the vessel was not in issue before the court, this
is the origin of the classic secorid proposition of The Osceola that "both by English and
American law" the vessel and her owner are liable in damages for injuries resulting from
unseaworthiness.
3. Sieradci v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1945).
4. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
5. It was a latent defect, indiscernible visually or by any inspection which shipowners reasonably give ships' equipment. Sieracki sued the shipowner and the shipowner impleaded both the shipbuilder and the shackle supplier.
6. The court stated: "If he were a seaman in the employ of the vessel he would,
of course, be entitled to a verdict on that showing alone .
Sieracki v. Seas Shipping
Co., 57 F. Supp. 724, 727 (E.D.Pa. 1944).
7. As a longshoreman Sieracki was only entitled to the exercise of reasonable care
on the part of the shipowner as determined by the common law tort concept of "business
invitee." Grasso v. Lorentzen, 149 F,2d 127 (2d Cir. 1945); The Etna, 43 F. Supp.
303 (E.D.Pa. 1942); The S.S. Anderson, 37 F. Supp. 695 (D.Md. 1941); The Dalhem,
41 F. Supp. 718 (D. Mass. 1941).
S. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
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are entitled to a "warranty of seaworthiness" by way of contract. But since
there is no privity of contract between a shipowner and a longshoreman
employee of an independent stevedore, the shipowner urged that a warranty
of seaworthiness does not extend to such a longshoreman. The Third
Circuit held Sieracki to be a "seaman."
In the Supreme Court the shipowner apparently admitted that a shipowner's obligation to a seaman was absolute with regard to seaworthiness.
"There could be no question of petitioner's liability for respondent's
injuries, incurred as they were here, if he had been in petitioner's employ
rather than hired by the stevedoring company."9 But the chief issue in
the Supreme Court was the shipowner's claim that a longshoreman was
not entitled to the seaman's warranty of seaworthiness. In granting recovery
to the longshoreman,' 0 Mr. Justice Rutledge reactivated an historically
understandable illusion that such workers are seamen for purposes of suit
under the Jones Act." Created in 1926 by International Stevedoring Co. v.
Haverty,12 this illusion served a real function when no other recovery was
open to longshoremen. It had been an almost neglected doctrine, however,
since it stimulated the enactment of the Federal Longshoremen's & Harbor
Workers' Act of 1927.'1
The Supreme Court's assertion in the Sieracki case that the shipowner's
duty to "seamen" is absolute was based on three cases which are not in
point 4 and its own dicta in The Osceolafl5 and in a 1944 decision, Mahnich
v. Southern S. S. Co.'6 In the latter case, Mr. Justice Stone, in a lengthy
9. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, at 90 (1946).
10. Thus the eventual decision in favor of Sieracki went further than the manifestly
dubious assertion of a shipowner's absolute warranty to mariners with respect to seaworthiness. It specifically decided that the owner of a vessel on which a longshoreman
was working owed him an absolute obligation of seaworthiness. The absolute obligation
arises "as an incident, not merely of the seaman's contract, but of performing the ship's
service with the owner's consent." Id. at 97. As a longshoreman is not by usual con
tract concepts an employee of the vessel, but of the stevedore, an independent contractor,
it was inevitable that a recovery against the shipowner be based upon a relational obligation arising from the injured longshoreman's status as a "seaman."
11. Merchant Marine Act, 1920, 41 STAT. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
12. 272 U.S. 50 (1926); Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930).
Mr.
Justice Holmes' decision gave longshoremen the rights of mariners under the Act in spite
of the apparent opposition of the interested groups that longshoremen were not seamen.
For precedents to the Harverty case, see Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S.
149 (1920); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (1917). For adverse com.
mentary on these precedents by the President of the International Longshoremen's Association, see 11 Am. L.AD. Lac. REv. 144 (1921); Furuseth, Harbor Workers are not
Seamen, p. 11 Am.LAB. LEc. REV. 139 (1921).
13. 44 STAT. 1424-1446 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1952). As to the neglect
of the Haverty doctrine, see Lawson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 94 F.2d 193 (4th Cir.
1938); Noguerira v.New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 32 Fed. 179 (2d Cit. 1929). RoBINsoN, AoMIRALTY, § 40 (1939).
14. The Vaco, 3 F.2d 476 (E.D.Pa. 1925); \Vni. Johnson & Co. v. Johansen, 86
Fed. 886 ((5th Cir. 1898); The Edith Godden, 23 Fed. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
15. See note 2 supra.
16. 321 U.S. 96 (1944), reversing 135 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1943). The continuing
impact of the Mahnich and Sieracki cases throughout the law and practice as to "sea,
men's" injuries cannot be stressed too strongly.
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dictum, described a shipowner's duty to his seamen in terms of a warranty
of seaworthiness which was said to follow cases adopting "the ruling of
The Osceola .. . that the exercise of due diligence does not relieve the
owner of his obligation to the seamen to furnish adequate appliances."' 7
The question really decided by Mr. Justice Stone was that the negligence
of the mate in supplying defective gear brings liability, as for unseaworthiness, upon the shipowner. The decision indicates affirmation of the lower
courts' extension of the shipowner's obligation into a "non-delegable duty"
encompassing the negligence of the master and mate. But the decision
did not require Mr. Justice Stone to pass on the question of the shipowner's
liability if the mate had exercised due diligence.
Mr. Justice Rutledge stated in the Sieracki case that the origin of the
absolute duty to indemnify any seaman injured in consequence 8 of the
unseaworthiness of the vessel was perhaps indeterminable. Questionable
as that assertion is, there is no doubt that the origin of the doctrine of
unseaworthiness itself is much more dubious.'0 It is said to have originated
in the ancient right of the crew to abandon an unseaworthy vessel,20 To
excuse misconduct or abandonment of ship, with the resultant forfeiture
of wages, it was necessary for the seamen to allege that the vessel was
unseaworthy. 2' The American treatises began to indicate by 1869 that a
seaman could, moreover, recover for injuries caused by unseaworthinessY2
17. 321 U.S. at 100. On the other hand, the actual decision in the Mahnich case
is compatible with the actual ruling of The Osceola as to seaworthiness based on due
diligence. The Henry B. Fiske, 141 Fed. 188, 190 (D. Mass, 1905); Burton v. Crieg,
271 Fed. 271 (5th Cir. 1921); Kahyis v. Arundel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 492 (D. Md. 1933);
The Cricket, 71 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1934); The Tawmie, 80 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1936).
Smith, Liability in the Admiralty for Injuries to Seamen, 19 lRv. L, Rnv. 418 (1906).
The less board issue of unscaworthiness before Mr. justice Stone was whether the
shipowner was liable for injuries suffered by a seaman in the fall of a defective staging
in which the mate and boatswain had negligently used obviously defective rope. The
shipowner's defense was that the injuries did not result from unseaworthiness, hut from
the negligence of Mahnich's fellow servant, the mate.
18. The cause of the injury must be the unseaworthiness. Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v.
Palo, 64 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1933); The Baymead, 88 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1937).
19. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sierclki, 328 U.S. 85, 91 n. 7 (1946).
20. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 99 (1944); The Arizona v.
Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 121 n.2 (1936). The first allusion in United States cases to unseaworthiness appears in suits of seamen for their wages. The old cases include The
Moslem, 17 Fed. Cas. 894, No. 9,875 (S.D.N.Y. 1846); Rice v. The Polly and Kitty, 20
Fed. Cas. 666, No. 11,754 (D.Pa. 1789); Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755, No,
3,930 (D.Pa. 1789).
21. The seaworthy doctrine has been in the American body of maritime law since
1789, when Peters, J., in Dixon v. The Cyrus, note 20 supra at 757, stated as two of the
"engagements" implied in every seaman's contract:
First, that at the commencement of the voyage, the ship shall be furnished
with all the necessary and customary requisites for navigation, or, as the term
is, shall be found seaworthy; and secondly, that the captain shall supply the
mariners with good and sufficient provisions whilst they are in his service ....
When from accidental neglect or otherwise there is a manifest and visible
deficiency, the mariners may reasonably complain and remonstrate-as in the
present case, when the seamen were obliged to go to the main top to command
those ropes which are usually within reach of the deck.
22. Parsons suggested that the principles of American maritime law would allow
such a recovery from the shipowner, citing Dixon v. The Cyrus, note 21 supra, and other
seamen's wage cases. 2 Shipping and Admiralty 78, n. 1 (1869).
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By the 1870's, United States courts recognized the rights of seamen
to indemnity for personal injuries resulting from unscaworthiness. Brown
v. The D.S. Cage2 3 includes the following: "It is the duty of the master
and owners to employ . . . servants of sufficient care and skill, to make it
probable that they will not cause injury to each other ......
In Halverson
v. Nisen,24 the court, relying as all the later cases did on the language
of Peters, J., in Dixon v. The Cyrus,2 5 rated the implied engagement of

seaworthiness towards the seaman on a par with the well established
implied engagement of "good and sufficient provisions." But these cases
prior to The Osceola followed the English courts26 and denied recovery
where the unseaworthiness was not attributable to the personal neglect of
the shipowner. In the D.S. Cage, the duty of the owners and master to
employ capable servants is only in "so far as they can do so with the use
of ordinary care ...
In the Halverson case, in explaining Why the
owner was not liable the court said:
If by the owner's negligence, the rigging or apparel are defective
and the seaman sustains an injury in consequence, the owner
would be liable. His liability in this respect does not differ from
any other master to a servant in his employment. It is the master's
duty in all cases to use ordinary care and diligence to provide
sound and safe materials for his servants. But he does not warrant
them to be so nor insure the servant against the consequences
*"2

23. 4 Fed. Cas. 367, No. 2,002 (C.C.E.ID. Tex. 1872). It is interesting to note
that though the concept of a seaworthy crew was later to gain acceptance than that of
a seaworthy ship and equipment, the basis for it was laid at as early a date.
24. 11 Fed. Cas. 310, No. 5,970 (D.Cal. 1876). The factual situation was very
similar to that in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). A mate bad
negligently used a worn and defective rope in a triangle rig for hoisting a seaman above
the deck.
25. 7 Fed. Cas. 755, 757, No. 3,930 (D.Pa. 1789). See note 18 supra.
26. The English cases had steadily denied a warranty of seaworthiness or absolute
duty with respect to seamen. This rule was considered by Parsons as opposed to the
principles of the American cases. See note 19 supra. In England, the shipowner was
not liable to the seamen for injuries resulting from unseaworthiness of the vessel caused
by the neglect or default of his agents or the master, but only for unseaworthiness caused
by the shipowner's personal neglect or within his personal knowledge at the moment the
vessel got underway. Couch v. Steel, 3 E. & B. 402, 118 Eng. Rep 1193 (1854). The
shipowner, by understanding or contract with the seamen, was permitted to employ them
on a ship which was known to be unseaworthy. The latter rule was abolished in 1876
by the Merchant Shipping Act, 39 & 40 VICT. C. 80 § 5 (1877), The Act, which was
re-enacted by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 VICT. C. 60, § 548 (1895),
imposed on the shipowner and his agents a standard of "reasonable means" to make the
ship seaworthy.
English cases did, however, as early as 1762, Lee v. Beach, 1 Park Ins. 468, give
recognition to an implied warranty of seaworthiness for the benefit of merchants and
underwriters in the law on carriage of goods and marine insurance, which was absolute,
i.e., not satisfied by the exercise of due care. Steel v. State Line Steamship Co., 3 A.C.
72 (1877). The distinction between the warranty of seaworthiness in the carriage of
goods prior to the Harter Act and the seaworthiness doctrine as to mariners has continued to befuddle the American courts. See, e.g., Mahnich v. S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96,
101 (1944); Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U. S. 255, 259 (1922).
27. 4 Fed Gas. 367, No. 2,002 (C.C.E.D. rex. 1872). The court overruled exceptions to a libel alleging the owner's negligent failure to keep the steamer properly manned
causing injuries sustained by a boiler explosion.
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of their defects.
The foundation of his liability is his personal
2
negligence.
But the term seaworthy seldom showed up in these nineteenth
century decision in seamen's personal injury suits. Even at the close of
the 1870's, Desty 0 did not list unseaworthiness as a ground upon which
to postulate damages. Citing the D.S. Cage, Desty did, however, state
that the seaman could recover for injuries arising from culpable negligence,
or neglect or misconduct of the officers.30
One of the first full-fledged discussions of a shipowner's liability to a
seaman for unseaworthiness is in The Lizzie Frank.1 The case presents the
interesting development of an attempted, but unsuccessful, unseaworthiness
recovery coming in under the allegation of negligence 2 The form in which
the libelant's proctor chose to phrase his seaworthiness theory, that of an
implied warranty, was an attempt to expand the implied "engagement" in
The Cyrus case. The theory made it easy for the court to dispose of the
3 3 without pleading to
contention by treating it as a claim ex contractu
sustain it. Then the court cites the English law: that "there is no implied
warranty of seaworthiness in a contract between an owner of a ship and a
seaman." 3 4 "But," says the court, "it is said that this is repugnant to
the American law." 35 The court accepts the view that the owner is bound
to provide a seaworthy ship but "he is not an insurer or warrantor of the
seaman against latent and undiscoverable defects in the vessel."3611 An
"injury may occasion a temporary or permanent disability, but that is
not a ground for indemnity from the owner, unless there has been negligence
37
on his part."
Thus the court opens two doors. The obvious one is that a recovery
for unseaworthiness may in the future be allowed if the libelant pleads it.
But secondly, in disallowing the implied warranty of seaworthiness claim
on the ground that it is ex contractu, the court finds it convenient to ignore
28. 11 Fed. Cas. 310, No. 5,970 (D.Cal. 1876).

29. DESTY, SHIPPING
30. Id. at 139, 161.

AND ADMIRALTY

(1879).

31. 31 Fed. 477 (S.D.Ala. 1887).
32. The fact that unseaworthiness was not alleged seems further to indicate that
it was as yet a doctrine of little recognition in seamen's injury cases. The case involved
the breaking of a chock-typical seaworthiness question as the doctrine developed.
33. This unfortunate formulation still haunts us. As the modern seaworthiness
remedy has also been premised on a warranty, the Supreme Court had real difficulty in
granting recovery to fringe workers, at least on the conceptual level. See note 10 supra.
The solution which it chose of calling the right to seaworthiness an incident of performing the ship's service, similar to the right to maintenance and cure, shows the difficulty
of rationale. The latter remedy has always been held to be cumulative to other rights,
supposedly because of its relation to the ship's service, while the right to seaworthiness
has never been so held, neither before nor after Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S.
85, 90 (1946).
34. 31 Fed. at 479 (S.D.Ala. 1887).
35. Ibid. The statement is a clear reference back to the prophetic footnote of
Parsons in 1869. See note 26 supra.
36. 31 Fed. at 480.
37. Id. at 481. See The Robert C. McQuillen, 91 Fed. 685 (D. Con. 1899).
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its point that there must be negligence as judged by the standard of the
omnipresent reasonably prudent man. On the contrary: "Assuming, for
the present, that there was an implied warranty of seaworthiness, and that
there has been a breach of such warranty by the breaking of the chock,
it would not necessarily follow that the owner was guilty of negligence . . .
it would be immaterial whether the breaking resulted from negligence
or not. There may be a breach of warranty without negligence. 38a Once
a warranty of seaworthiness should become recognized, the latter argument
paves the way for a doctrine entirely divorced from the due diligence
standard of negligence. This second door remained all but closed in the
federal courts until 1937 when Judge Augustus N. Hand used it as the
basis for his decision in The H. A. Scandrett.39 It was only eleven years
ago that the Supreme Court gave enduring recognition to an absolute 4and
0
continuing warranty of seaworthiness by a shipowner to his mariners.
After the Sieraeki decision in 1946, the lower courts, faced with the
inutility of pursuing their own historical, 4 1 economic 42 or logical 43 analysis,
have unanimously assumed that the shipowner has a continuing and absolute
duty to provide a seaworthy ship for the "seamen." The only function of
the lower courts has been the limiting application of the unlimited judicial
38. 31 Fed. at 479.
the liability for any injuries arising
39. 87 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1937). "...
out of the neglect to supply a seaworthy vessel is not dependent on the exercise of reasonable care but is absolute."
The pursuit of the
40. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U. S. 96 (1944).
giowth of the seaman's rights and the decline of the shipowner's defenses leads back
through Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939); The HI. A. Scandrelt,
87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir 1937); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936); Warner v.
Goltra, 293 U.S. 155 (1934); Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U. S. 367 (1932);
Pacific Steamship Co. v. Peterson (1928); Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S.
255 (1922); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); The Osceola,
189 U.S. 158 (1903).
41. See the cases both before and after The Osceola cited on the preceding pages,
which seem to indicate clearly that previous to Mr. Justice McReynolds 1922 dictum
in Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, note 40 supra, unseaworthiness in seamen's injury
cases was agreed to be based on a standard of due diligence.
42. The fringe workers, including longshoremen, are perhaps better protected than
mariners, the traditional "wards of the admiralty." Their remedies include the same
seaworthiness right as mariners, a right to recovery for a most flexible common law
negligence, and rights which mariners do not possess under the Federal Longshoremen's
& Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The reactivation by the Sieracki case of the
Hlaverty rationale, which permitted a longshoreman to recover for negligence under the
Jones Act, lays open the probability that in the future some longshoreman will once
again attempt such a recovery. The only deterrent to an immediate attempt is the
very effectiveness of the seaworthiness action. The advantages of a negligence action
tinder the Jones Act over one at common law are that (1) the defense of assumption of
risk is barred and (2) the defense of contributory negligence only goes to the question
of damages. Under the rationale of Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953),
it is doubtful that the second distinction has any meaning.
43. The obvious fiction of treating longshoremen as "seamen," either under the
veil of "performing the ship's service" as in the Sieracki case, or under the word 'seaman"
in the Jones Act as in the Haverty case, defies not only logic perhaps, but, since the
Harbor Workers' Act, common sense as well. The implication in both cases that the
classification is reasonable because longshoremen are performing work once done by the
crew is probably an historical fallacy, considering that special groups whose duty it was
to perform these tasks have existed since ancient antiquity.
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conscience in determining what are the contents of "seaworthy" and
"seamen" as affected by the particular facts. Since the 1953 Supreme Court
decision in Pope 6 Talbot Inc. v. Hawn,4 and the 1954 decision in Alaska
S.S. Co. v. Petterson,45 even the particular facts take on less significance.
It becomes clear that the Sieracki holding was not, either horizontally 46
or vertically, 47 so to speak, the outer limit of the shipowner's absolute
obligation, but its hard core. 48
44. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
45. 347 U.S. 396 (1954); rehearing denied 347 U.S. 994.
46. In the Pope & Talbot case, the shipowner's obligation was widened to cover
a shoreside carpenter of an independent contractor.
47. In the Petterson case, the shipowner's obligation was extended to cover an
appliance owned and exclusively controlled by all independent contractor.
48. The lower courts have been quick to recognize that it is the spirit of the new
decisions which is important, and not the old factual distinctions. Dixon v. United
States, 1954 Am. Mar. Cas. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), involved a Chief Mate who was
injured on a ladder which he was sent to inspect. The court rejected a distinction made
on similar facts in Brnszewski v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 163 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1948);
Byars v. Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc., 55 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1946); that the ship
owner is not liable when the injury to a shoreside repairman is caused by the defective
condition which lie was supposed to repair. Recognizing the distinction as a limited
recrudescence of the defense of assumption of risk, the court commented: "Moreover
the whole drift of the law has been away from the result urged here by respondent. The
Supreme Court since its historic decision in the Osceola case has steadily expanded the
doctrine of seaworthiness to others than the immediate members of the ship's crew,"
citing the Sieracki and Pope & Talbot cases and the specific refusal in the latter to reverse the former. The doctrine of the Bruszewski and Byars cases has been otherwise
severely restricted. Kulukundis v. Strand, 202 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 1953); Becker
v. Waterman S.S. Co., 179 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1950). On the appeal in Dixon v. U.S.,
219 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1955), Judge Harlan, upon a review of the turn of the century
cases containing the original doctrine of seaworthiness based on negligence, remanded
the case to the district court. The opinion is the first to recognize the historic development of seaworthiness in seamen's injury cases, exposing the fallacy also of the purported
analogy made in Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger between seamen's injury and cargo
cases. There is more than a subtle hint that the lower court should follow suit by basing
any seaworthiness recovery on negligence.
Judge Hlarlan justifies and perhaps weakens his attempt to limit seaworthiness by a
mechanical distinction that the conditions in the Dixon case were ones which arose after
the voyage had commenced, Because of the relatively short time span since the
Sieracki case Judge Harlan does not show a lack of ardor in admitting that: "Nor have
we found any case in which it has been stated that absolute liability would be imposed
with respect to unseaworthy conditions arising after the voyage had commenced." Yet
it becomes clear from the opinion itself that the distinction is a technical one, running
contrary to the assumption of every appellate court since the nineteenth century wage
cases: "While language in some of the cases and texts does seem to reflect the view
that the warranty to seamen is limited to conditions existing before the vessel has begun
her voyage-liability for unseaworthy conditions coming into existence thereafter being
only for failure to exercise due diligence-we are unable to find that any appellate
court has squarely held the warranty to be so limited." Ignoring the fact that the
distinction is only a smoke screen for an invitation to Congress to limit the whole doctrine
of absolute liability of unseaworthiness, the opinion at this point does not go far enough
back into the history which it has been expounding. For the wage cases necessarily
involved seamen who had abandoned ship prior to its leaving its home port or some port
of call. Therefore the statement in the wage cases that the shipowner's engagement
existed at the commencement of the voyage was probably a mere reflection of the fact
situation rather than a substantive limitation which would be anomalous if applied to all
injury cases, as judge Harlan seems to admit.
In the light of the Supreme Court's unanimous tendency in Boudoin v. Lykes Bros.
S.S. Co ......... U.S -------.....
(1955), to maintain thd vertical extension of absolute
liability, it seems too early to predict how much lasting influence Judge Harlan's attempt
to limit absolute liability is likely to have. See note 57 infra.
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The warranty of seaworthiness that the ship and its equipment are.
not defective 0 has been extended to the adequacy and competency of the

cre w 0 Just as a latent defect of a ship or its material, without notice
to the shipowner,"' suffices to render a vessel unseaworthy,52 so defective
personnel renders a vessel unseaworthy, and the owner liable, even if such
defect is latent and unknown to the owner.53 In the past it had been
determined that a brutal mate rendered a ship unseaworthy. "4 Today's
decisions distinguish between the unseaworthiness caused by the presence
on board of a paranoiac cook

5

or a homosexual niessman '" who assault

49. But it. is not required that it be the best possible equipment, Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952). It is only required that equipment be- reasonably
fit for the use for which it was intended.
50. Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1953); Yates v.
Dunn, 11 F.R.D. 386 (D.Del); The Rolph, 299 Fed. 52 (C.C.A. 9th 1924). But the
warranty does not guarantee that the crew will be free from negligence, Keen v. Overseas
Tankship Corp., supra; ef. Cookingham v. United States, 184 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1950);
Larsson v. Coastwise Line, 181 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1950). it guarantees only that the
seamen will be equal in disposition and in seamanship to the ordinary men in the calling. If a longshoreman's injuries result solely from the manner in which the work is
done under the stevedore's supervision, the shipowner is not liable, Berti v. Cyprien
Fabre, 1954 Am. Mar. Cas, 1111 (2d Cir. 1954); Amador v. M/S Ronda, 1954 Am.
Mar. Cas. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
51. But a confused special rule has been developing where the lack of notice is
of so called "transitory unseaworthiness" of the ship, Cookingham v. United States, supra
note 50. The rule, a rather awkward attempt to limit the extension of the shipowner's
obligation, holds:
While generally there is an absolute liability on a shipowner, regardless of notice,
for the unseaworthy character of his ship, where there is merely a transitory
unseaworthiness, arnd no fault or failure of appliance or equipment, the shipowner's liability arises only from failure to remove that transitory unseaworthiness within a reasonable time of notice, actual or constructive, or from failure to
use ordinary care to keep the ship free from transitory unseaworthiness.
Gladstone v. Matson Navigation Co., 1954 Am. Mar Cas. 1004 (D.C, of Appeal 1st,
Cal. 1954), involving a stewardess who slipped and fell down an oily stairway. The rule
is actually the original doctrine of seaworthiness' with a modified name, designed to
apply to only the most extreme category of cases. See, E.G. Krey v. United States, 123
F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1941), commented on in The Tangled Seine, 57 Y(__5 L.J. 243, 254
(1947), where a seaman fell in the shower of a docked ship and was indemnified
because the soapy floor made the shower unseaworthy.
52. Dixon v. United States, 1954 Am. Mar. Cas. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Even if
the injured seaman knows of the defect, it is only important in applying the rules of
comparative negligence, Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1938). The
Dixon case accepts a restricted interpretation of Bruszewski v. Isthmian S.S. Co., that a
shipowner is only relieved of liability when a shoreside worker is engaged to repair an
obviously defective condition which is the direct cause of his injury and he is warned or
chargeable with knowledge of the danger. See note 48 supra. Kulukundis v. Strand,
202 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 1953). In the attempt to limit the Bruszewski case to
shoreside repairmen, the Dixon case perpetuates the supposedly rejected distinction
between seamen and shoreside workers as to unseaworthiness. See also Darlington v.
National Bulk Carriers, 157 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1947).
53. Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co., 1954 Am. Mar. Cas. 1191 (D.C.NJ. 1954).
54. The Rolph, 299 Fed. 52 (9th Cir. 1924) affirming, 293 Fed, 269 (N.D. Cal.
1923).
55. Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1953).
56. See note 53 supra.
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fellow crew members with a meat cleaver, from the seaworthiness where only
57
a mariner's fists are the weapons.
In the Second5 8 and Third 9 Circuits a shipowner's obligation to
"seamen" has been regarded as terminating upon the delivery of an
appliance in good order into the exclusive control of an independent con
tractor. But in Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson o the Supreme Court affirmed
without opinion a decision of the Ninth Circuit that an independent
stevedore's ownership and exclusive control of a block which failed in ordinary
use was insufficient to relieve a shipowner of absolute liability for injuries
caused to a longshoreman.
Injuries to seamen happen relatively seldom through latent defects.
Phrasing the doctrine of unseaworthiness in terms of absolute liability adds
comparatively few instances to those for which the shipowner would be
liable for negligence 0 ' under the Jones Act.02 Cortes v. Baltimore Insular
Line established that the Supreme Court did not consider itself bound
by common law rules of negligence, reiterating that it would take into
account the peculiar hazards of the seas and the traditional relations which
obtain between shipowner and marincr-"ward of the admiralty." Whether
the same rationale should apply to shoreside workers is questionable,64
either as it presently does under the seaworthiness doctrine, or as it may
in the future do if such workers as longshoremen once again become
"seamen" under the Jones Act.
57. Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1953). See also Lykes
Bros. S.S. Co. v. Boudoin, 211 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1954), in which Judge Hutcheson
rejects the reasoning of the Keen case. The Fifth Circuit reversed an unseaworthiness
recovery by a seaman who was struck with a brandy bottle by a fellow crew member
caught in the act of stealing it. But the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the
Keen doctrine in reversing the Fifth Circuit, Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.....
U.S., 75 S. Ct. 355 (1955) decided February 28, 1955 (N.Y.Times, March 1, 1955,
p. 53).
58. Mollica v. Compania Sud-America, 202 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1953); Lynch v.
United States, 163 F,2d (2d Cir. Cir. 1947); Lauro v. United States, 162 F.2d 32 (2d
Cir. 1947); Grasso v. Lorentzen, 149 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1945).
59. Rogers v. U.S. Lines, 205 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1953), rev'd per euriam, 1954 Am.
Mar. Cas. 1088; Lopez v. American-llawaiian S.S. Lines, 201 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1953).
102 U. PA. L. REv. 402.
60. 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
61. "Tle accident having been caused by faulty equipment onder the control of
the 'shipowner', there is liability for the consequential injury whether we call in unsca.
worthiness or failure to furnish a safe place to work." Yarbrough v. Amer. Mail Line,
Ltd., 1954 Am. Mar. Cas, 1172 (D.C. S.D. Cal. 1954), involving a seaman hit on the
head by a heel block of a boom frozen in an improper position because of rust and
corrosion.
62. 41 SlAT. 1007 (1920), q6 U.S.C. § 688 (1952). For an unusual illustration
of such an instance, see Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co., 1954 Am. Mar. Cas. 1191
(D.C.N.J. 1954): Since the elements of shipowner's "negligence and knowledge are not
essential to recovery for unseaworthiness, and the quantum of damages in either aspect is
much the same, we tUrn to the consideration of" unscaworthiness. The Jones Act does
not at present apply to shoreside workers.
63. 287 U.S. 367 (1932); ef. Alpha S.S. Corp. v. Cain, 281 U.S. 642 (1930).
64. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in the Pope & Talbot case,
which further extended the category of "seamen." He argues that the decision so confuses admiralty law with common and statutory tort law as to destroy the integrity of
admiralty law as a separate system based on the peculiarities and risks of seagoing labor.
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But the practical importance to seamen of phrasing "unseaworthiness"
in terms of absolute liability is'that recovery by the injured seaman in the
ordinary case is as good as certain. As adaptable as the negligence rule
under the Jones Act is,6 under the unseaworthiness doctrine the seaman
has an additional advantage. In practically every case he can obtain an
instruction to the jury that the shipowner is liable without fault if the
vessel is found not to be seaworthy. Nor does such an instruction preclude
him from obtaining the usual instructions relating to liability for negligence.,,
Under the rule of the Cortes case, there is almost always room for a finding
of negligence. 7 But should it fail, the doctrine of an absolute obligation
for unseaworthiness operates in the seaman's behalf, even in cases which
are principally based on negligence. 8 Thus the attempt which failed in
the Lizzie Frank 09-the attempt to "switch hit" from negligence to unseaworthiness-is now a recognized procedure of attack. Not only do
the seaworthiness doctrine and the Jones Act negligence rule overlap, but,
as seen in Hollis v. Grace Line,7 0 they merge inscrutably.7

65. Newery v. Smith, 161 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1947).
Unseaworthiness has the
practical advantage that it is not limited by the three-year statute of limitations, under
the 1939 amendment of the Employers Liability Act, 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C.
56 (1952).
66. For an illustration of how the supernumerary instructions as to negligence can
work against the claimant's interest, see Gladstone v. Matson Naviatigon Co., 1954
Am, Mar. Cas. 1004 (D. Cal. 1004):
While it is true that the jury under the evidence could have found for defendant
[Author-plaintiff I on the unseaworthiness count, we have no way of knowing
whether they did so or whether they found under the Jones Act theory...."
In a recent action for common law negligence and unseaworthiness, the instructions
as to liability for negligence were denied. Berti v. Cyprien Fabre, 1954 Am. Mar. Cas.
1111 (2d Cir. 1954). See note 71 infra.
67. For an illustration of the confusion of both doctrines which results from the
attempt to distinguish between the absolute obligation of seaworthiness and the almost
absolute obligation under the Jones Act, see the trial and the appellate courts' interpretations in Gladstone v. Matson Navigation Co., 1954 Am. Mar Cas. 1004, 1006 (1954):
Either under the Jones Act or the unseaworthiness theory, the stewardess must
prove notice of the defendant of the slippery condition of the stairway (such
notice to be either actual or constructive and the failure of defendant within a
reasonable time thereafter to remove such condition.
. .Thus either under the Jones Act or the General Maritime Law pertaining
to transitory conditions the rule is practically the same in requiring notice of
the condition.
. . .When discussing the requirements under the unseaworthy count the court
stressed the necessity of notice. While the court instructed the jury that they
must consider the instructions as a whole, the insructions concerning notice were
clearly limited to the unseaworthy cause of action and could not reasonably have
been considered by the jury to apply to the Jones Act questions.
See note 51 supra.
68. Mahnicb v.Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
69. 31 Fed. 477 (S.D. Ala. 1887).
70. 1952 Am. Mar. Cas. 1609 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
71. The same is true of the seaworthiness doctrine and common law negligence.
In Berti v. Cyprien Fabre, 1954 Am. Mar. Cas. 1111 (2nd Cir. 1954), a longshoreman
sought a conventional charge on negligence and the standard of ordinary case which
was denied by the District Court. Judge Clark, speaking for the Circuit Court, agreed:
Insofar as Cyprien had an ordinary duty to provide a safe place to work, it here
completely overlapped its absolute duty to furnish a seaworthy ship. For the
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The question remains whether the "seaman" is required to elect under
the Jones Act 72 or at common law73 between a claim of negligence and a
claim of unscaworthiness before the case is submitted to the jury. That
the shoreside "seaman's" claim of common law negligence may be submitted
with a claim of unseaworthiness is probably permanently settled by the
Pope $ Talbot case.7 ' An ultimate resolution depends (1) on the degree
to which shoreside workers' rights will be made to parallel mariners' rights,
ini their disadvantages as well as their advantages, and thus (2) perhaps
on the Supreme Court's eventual decision as to whether "seamen" must
make an election under the Jones Act. There is some understandable
uncertainty as to the Jones Act in the state and lower federal courts, but
the majority of recent cases seem to accurately appraise the handwriting
on the wall and permit the "seaman" to present his claim to the jury on
both unseaworthiness and negligence grounds 72 In the Pope & Talbot
case Mr. Justice Jackson frankly recognized in the minority opinion that:
"The court's instruction scrambled common-law negligence doctrines with

be held related to the condition
of a cable and the absence of beam-locking devices. Either, if proved, would
render the ship unseaworthy.

only faults charged for which Cyprien could

72. "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by
jury .... ." (Emphasis supplied). 41 ST'r. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
73. The precise question here is whether a shoreside worker "seaman", as contrasted with a traditional "seaman", is also going to be forced to make some election
of remedies.
If a shoreside worker enjoys the advantages of being a "seaman" for purposes of
the unseaworthiness claim, should he also be permitted to avail himself of the common
law negligence claim denied to mariners. This problens was specifically decided in the
affirmative by the Pope & Talbot case. But should he also be permitted to present the
two claims simultaneously to the trier of fact?
74. 346 U.S. 406 (1953). A contrary rule requiring election had until 1946 been
settled as to mariners under the Jones Act. That common law negligence may instead
be assimilated into unscaworthiness. See note 71 sura.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the Pope & Talbot case, i. I, raises
an allied question whether a shoreside worker is entitled to a jury. in a suit based on
both maritime and commson law causes of action. The only objection to the procedure
there could be that the maritime cause should not he tried to a jury. In the light of
Supreme Court decisions which extend shoreside workers' rights even beyond the parallel
rights of mariners, the objection seems clearly foreclosed in that the submission of the
unseaworthiness claim to the jury is already an everyday occurrence in suits by mariners.
75. McCarthy v. American Eastern Corp., 175 F.2d 724 (3d Cir, 1949) reaffirming
German v. Carnegie Steel Corp., 156 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1946); Balado v. Lykes Bros.,
179 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1950), deliberate dictum rejecting its position in Skolar v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 60 F.2d 893, 894 (2d Cir. 1932) and McGhee v. United'States, 165 F.2d
287 (2d Cir. 1947); Thomsen v. The Dorene B, 91 F. Stpp. 549 (S.D.

Cal. 1950)

rejecting Reed v. Arkansas, 88 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Cal. 1950), Contra, Boothby v.
Washington Toll Bridge Authority, 1954 Am. Mar. Cas. 479 (Sup. Ct., King County,
Wash. 1954) and Spangled v, Matson Navigation Co., 1950 Am Mar. Gas. 409 (Wash.
1950) relying on the rationale of Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U. S. 130 (1928),;
As the unseaworthiness rationale is no longer grounded on tort, but either on a "warranty
of seaworthiness or a "relational" duty, there is no rational requirement for an election
of remedies.
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admiralty principles of indemnity for unseaworthiness." 76 The courts have
felt it necessary to attempt to distinguish between remedies when as a
practical matter it no longer serves any useful function and is extremely
difficult. Election now only serves as a protection against that difficulty
for claimants who do not realize that it is unnecessary to allege negligence
in permitting unseaworthiness when a recovery can be based on alleging
and proving the unseaworthiness alone. A forced election or a denial of
the negligence charge 7 renders the claimant a service, for it serves to
protect him against the likelihood of the trial court's error in distinguishing
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring 6pinion
between the remedies.7
in the Pope & Talbot case, stated that:
. . . it will be rare that the circumstances of an injury will
constitute negligence but not unseaworthiness.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter seems thoroughly borne out by the cases 9 and
the exceptions will be even more rare under the Pope 6 Talbot rationale.

406 (1953).
76.
". 346
. theU.S.
charge below so scrambled two theories of recovery that the jury
could not possibly have had a fair understanding of the law of the case. The
jury was instructed on the one hand that negligence was not necessary to recovery
because of the unseaworthiness theory and on the other that negligence itself
was a basis for recovery . . . this case was begun, tried, submitted and decided
as a negligence action, while it is sustained here on an admiralty doctrine of
liability for breach of warranty which does not at all depend upon negligence."

The trial court's charge is set out at some length inthe Third Circuit's opinion, 1952
Am. Mar. Cas. 1708, 1712-1716 (3d Cir. 1952),
77. See note 71 supra.
78. See note 67 supra.
App. 141, 70 N.E.2d 848 (1947);
79. Hendricksen v. City of Chicago, 330 Ill.

Miller v. Wessel, Duval & Co., 1947 Am, Mar. Cas. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Krey v.

United States, 123 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1941); Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305
U.S. 424 (1939); American Pac. Whaling Co. v. Kristensen, 93 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1937).
Contrast the negligence brutality cases with the unseaworthiness brutality cases, Thompson
v. Coastal Oil Co., 1954 Am Mar. Cas. 1191 (D.C.N.J. 1954) (unseaworthy); Keen] v.

Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied 343 U.S. 966 (1953)

(unseaworthy); Hong v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (negligence);

Koehler v. Presque-isle Tr. Co., 141 F. 2d 490 (2d Cir. 1944) (negligence).

